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4 APR 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Status of the Pilot Study on National  
Intelligence Support to Field Commanders

1. I have reviewed, and have attached, [redacted] status report to you on the Pilot Study on National Intelligence Support to Field Commanders. After reading the report, I think you will agree that he's made as much progress as we reasonably could have hoped.

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2. You should note two things in particular:

a. The JCS and Services are still reluctant to give you visibility for their intelligence force support assets. This is a potential problem area that we will have to watch closely.

b. The 1 July target date for getting the report to you may slip. I agree with Jack, however, that we shouldn't sacrifice quality for time.

3. It looks to me that, at long last, we are making progress.

/s/ Samuel V. Wilson

JCS review completed.

Samuel V. Wilson  
Lieutenant General, USA  
D/DCI/IC

Attachments:  
As stated

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3 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Status Report on the Pilot Study on  
National Intelligence Support to Field  
Commanders

1. The attached status report covers the background leading to the pilot study, highlights JCS and Service concerns, describes our progress so far, and outlines what we still have to do.

2. As you review this report, please keep in mind that the pilot study:

- Has a limited purpose. Our principal goals are to size the problem, develop procedures, and gain insight into possible payoffs from studies of this kind.
- Uses study group assumptions for national intelligence needs. We should have an authoritative statement of national needs to focus future studies on specific possibilities for mutual support.
- Uses a representative sample for theater intelligence needs. For more detailed studies, EEL will have to be more comprehensive and specific in terms of timeliness and accuracy.
- Has a scenario limited in area and forces. The results will not give us a worldwide model.
- Is complicated by Service reluctance to make intelligence force support assets visible. We think this hurdle has been overcome. It still bears watching.

/s/  
Brigadier General, USAF  
PD/D/DCI/IC

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REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
STATUS OF THE PILOT STUDY ON NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT  
TO FIELD COMMANDERS

Background

25X1 [ ] The President's memorandum of 5 November 1971 highlighted the DCI's responsibility for all intelligence programs, including "tactical" intelligence. With few exceptions, tactical intelligence assets fall outside the NFIP. They include the intelligence units and activities organic to or in support of the operating military forces, and also strategic warning systems, military department and theater intelligence staffs, and R&D projects.

25X1 [ ] Soon after getting the President's memorandum, Mr. Helms agreed that Dr. Hall should take the lead on non-NFIP Defense intelligence. For the rest of Mr. Helms' tenure, and while Dr. Schlesinger was the Director, there were no significant DCI initiatives to deal with tactical, or force support, intelligence.

25X1 [ ] You took the first serious action to get at the problem. In your FY 1974 objectives for the Intelligence Community, you told the President that, jointly with DoD and the JCS, you would review military intelligence needs and look for ways that national assets could support the forces. You continued this objective for FY 75.

JCS and Service Concerns

25X1 [ ] As intelligence buying power decreased, management interest in the relationship between NFIP and non-NFIP programs and activities increased. This interest focuses on achieving savings by eliminating duplication and by improving mutual support. The resource implications tend to reinforce legitimate, strongly held JCS and Service fears.

25X1 [ ] They believe they can't be sure of national intelligence support in wartime because national needs will take priority over combat intelligence needs, many national systems are extremely vulnerable, NFIP systems can't report fast enough for combat support, and communications

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[REDACTED]

will be inadequate. They are, therefore, very defensive about their force support intelligence assets. They have concern that if made visible above the Service level:

- 25X1 - [REDACTED] These assets would be diverted from their primary missions to work on national intelligence tasks.
- 25X1 - [REDACTED] Funding for these assets would be centralized across-the-board, taking from the Services responsibility for resource decisions for them.
- 25X1 - [REDACTED] These assets would be traded off for national systems incapable of supporting the forces in a timely and usable way, and unresponsive to the combat commanders in the field.

Memorandum of Agreement

25X1 [REDACTED] Against this background, in November 1973, you and Secretary Schlesinger appointed representatives who worked out an agreement for studying the tactical/national intelligence interface. This agreement called for the JCS to do six things:

- 25X1 - [REDACTED] Determine with reasonable precision the tactical intelligence assets to be included in the study.
- 25X1 - [REDACTED] Identify all tactical intelligence assets that contribute significantly to both national and tactical intelligence.
- 25X1 - [REDACTED] Identify the peacetime, crisis and wartime requirements to which these assets respond.
- 25X1 - [REDACTED] Compare these requirements with support available from national sources.
- 25X1 - [REDACTED] Identify military force requirements that could be satisfied by national assets.
- 25X1 - [REDACTED] Identify the contribution to the national intelligence effort that can be made by tactical intelligence assets.

25X1 [REDACTED] The IC Staff was to use the JCS report to develop recommendations to increase mutual support and eliminate duplication. The JCS, however, unable to overcome their defensiveness about force support assets, did only one of the six tasks. Their report on non-CDIP assets that contribute

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[ ]  
to national intelligence was sent to you by Secretary Clements in May 1974. After six months, we were back to just about where we started.

#### The Pilot Study

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[ ] To get back on track, you proposed to Secretary Schlesinger, in June 1974, that the next step should be a study to develop specific recommendations for mutual intelligence support between the national level and the operating forces. You suggested starting with a pilot study to size the problem, develop procedures, and gain insight into the payoffs that are possible. By August 1974, we had approved terms of reference for this pilot study. This is our current effort and the focus of the report that follows.

#### Other Related Studies

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[ ] You should bear in mind that this pilot study is only one of many linked to the tactical/national interface. So far, we have identified over 50 related studies, reviews and exercises, some completed and some in progress. For example, here are a few of the more interesting:

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- [ ] An IRAC/IR&D Council study to identify R&D programs related to tactical SIGINT, and to recommend possibilities for inter-agency integration of effort.

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- [ ] A NSC Staff examination of tactical applications for national reconnaissance assets.

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- [ ]
- [ ]

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[ ] We are building a working bibliography of these related efforts. It will be attached to the final pilot study report.

#### Pilot Study Organization

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[ ] The study group for the pilot study has a member from each of the military Services, DIA, NSA, NRO, CIA, US European Command, the Joint Staff and the IC Staff.

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It has observers from the Defense Investigative Service and DMA. Rear Admiral Robert P. Hilton, USN, Joint Staff, and I co-chair the study group. We each have executive officers appointed from our staffs to support us.

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[ ] Two working groups, with members from the same organizations as the study group, work under the study group's direction and guidance. The National Working Group postulates national priorities and assesses the capabilities of NFIP assets to meet the intelligence needs of theater commanders in light of those priorities. The Theater Working Group looks for gaps in theater intelligence to be matched against national system capabilities. To do this, it defines theater intelligence needs and assesses the capability of theater forces to meet them. It also broadly assesses theater capabilities to meet national needs.

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[ ] The study group will integrate the working group assessments and put together a final study report. That report will go to the Chairman, JCS, and to General Wilson for comment before we send it to you and the Secretary of Defense.

#### Study Scenario

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[ ] For the scenario for this pilot study, the Commander of US Forces in Europe recommended a contingency plan that commits US forces against Soviet intervention in a Mid-East war. The plan has several operational phases and stages. (The scenario starts with C-Day.)

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25X1 [ ] The study group agreed to use this plan. For the pilot study, however, it decided to limit the scenario to the last ten days of the defensive phase and the conventional offensive operations phase (C+25 to C+48). This will meet all of our study objectives. It permits assessment of a broad range of national intelligence assets against representative combat intelligence requirements. It forces consideration of competing intelligence priorities between the national and theater levels.

Intelligence Assets

25X1 [ ] Both working groups have drawn up lists of intelligence assets for this pilot study. For the National Working Group, this includes the assets in the NFIP, except those under wartime operational control of theater forces. It also includes selected non-NFIP assets, such as SR-71's. The Theater Working Group has a more difficult problem.

25X1 [ ] The Services, still sensitive about making their force support intelligence assets visible, balked at identifying assets other than those already in the NFIP or listed in Secretary Clements' memorandum to you of 21 May 1974. Clearly, this would have given a distorted picture of the theater's capability to satisfy its own and national requirements.

25X1 [ ] The Service Operations Deputies discussed this problem in the JCS arena. They agreed that the Theater Working Group would develop its set of theater assets from the forces assigned in the contingency plan and from other forces the theater commander might identify for the pilot study. Intelligence capabilities below the Army brigade, Air Force wing and Navy task group levels will be considered in the aggregate. The Theater Working Group report won't identify specific assets below those levels. This decision should let us do the job. We will watch progress and results closely.

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Intelligence Needs

25X1 [ ] At first, we started to develop a full set of theater intelligence needs--essential elements of information, or EEI, for each level in the scenario from theater command on down. This would have resulted in thousands of EEI--too many to handle in this pilot study.

25X1 [ ] The study group decided to limit theater EEI to a vertical sample, cutting across all command levels. Working in Europe with officers from the theater and component commands, the working group chairmen developed 82 sample EEI. These EEI represent information needs of units from each of the Services. They can be played against each of the national and theater intelligence assets.

25X1 [ ] The pilot study also has to consider national information needs. They support assumptions about the availability of national intelligence assets for employment against theater EEI. The working groups also need them to broadly assess how well theater assets committed in the scenario can meet national requirements for the area of operations.

25X1 [ ] The study group found no statement of national level information needs for wartime. The KIQs, DCID 1/2 and JCS intelligence objectives and priorities all cut off at the period of tension leading to hostilities.

25X1 [ ] The National Working Group has the job of developing criteria and assumptions for national information needs and for determining the availability and capabilities of national assets. (National requirements for crises and wartime needs more discussion. It might be a good subject for the NSCIC Working Group.)

Pilot Study Status

25X1 [ ] Here's where we are now:

- 25X1 - [ ] The study and working groups are organized.
- 25X1 - [ ] A scenario that gets us down to the combat intelligence level has been selected.
- 25X1 - [ ] National intelligence assets are listed; theater assets are hopefully under control.
- 25X1 - [ ] A good sample set of theater EEI has been developed.

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- [ ]
- [ ] A set of criteria and assumptions for national intelligence needs and for determining the availability and capabilities of national assets is close to completion.
  - [ ] Analysis has started where we have the data.
  - [ ] Briefly, here's what we still have to do:
  - [ ] Analyze theater capabilities to meet theater EEI and find the gaps.
  - [ ] Analyze national capabilities to meet theater EEI and fill the gaps.
  - [ ] Broadly analyze theater capabilities to meet assumed national information needs for the scenario area of operations.
  - [ ] Collate these analyses.

#### Study Methodology

[ ] The working groups will define criteria for assessing national and theater collection and reporting capabilities. They will use these criteria, and assumptions for the area of operations, availability, priorities, timeliness and weather, to estimate how well assets can satisfy needs. These estimates will be stated as confidence factors--high (60% or greater chance of meeting the need), moderate (40% to 59% chance), low (less than 40% chance), none and unknown.

#### Expected Study Results

[ ] Bearing in mind the limited purpose of this pilot study, here's what you can expect to get from it:

- [ ] Insight into the scope and complexity of the tactical/national intelligence interface. This is a basic need for planning.
- [ ] One methodology for analyzing interaction between tactical and national intelligence needs and capabilities. By comparing this to other methods, we can develop our approach to future studies.
- [ ] A model for looking at intelligence relationships between the theater and national levels. This should give insight into the areas where mutual support between NFIP and force support intelligence assets has the best payoff potential.

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- 25X1 ☐ Recommendations for possible improvements that can be made now.
- 25X1 ☐ Recommendations for future studies.
- 25X1 ☐ And, hopefully, intelligence support options that the JCS and our forces in Europe can crank into their current contingency planning.

Study Limitations

- 25X1 ☐ Limitations that the study group deliberately imposed on itself will condition the scope and depth of these study results. Briefly:
- 25X1 ☐ The scenario is limited to the Mid-East.
- 25X1 ☐ Theater forces are limited to units designated in the contingency plan.
- 25X1 ☐ The operational environment is limited to conventional warfare.
- 25X1 ☐ EEI for theater forces are limited to a representative sample.
- 25X1 ☐ National information needs are limited to study group assumptions.
- 25X1 ☐ The political situation is limited to actual conditions during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

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Completion Date

- 25X1 ☐ The study group still holds to July 1975 for submitting the final study report to you and the Secretary of Defense. This date could slip to later in the summer.
- 25X1 ☐ I will keep you informed.

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